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Abstract
To determine the sufficiency of Minimum Capital Requirements (MCR) in Basel IV du-
ring financial crises in the Mexican stock market, the paper performs a structural simu-
lation encompassing both the Standardised (SA) and Internal Models Approach (IMA)
employing different modelling techniques. The study finds an excessive increase in MCR
even in abnormal slumps, furthermore stressing that SA establishes a high floor and only
super-leptokurtic models are able to pass its stringent validation standards. Therefore, it
is recommended that elements in SA be adaptable to avoid unnecessary capital largeness
and the evaluation of the IMA and its interaction with SA revised. Although the outco-
mes strongly suggest the need to perform adjustments in the regulations, further tests on
more markets could help bolster the results, despite the study ranking among the first to
assess the adequacy and interplay between Basel IV’s two approaches in Latin American
emerging markets. The upshot indicates that Basel IV renders high MCR even for huge
falls, placing models at a disadvantage and discouraging its use. The adoption of flexible
calibration parameters would align both avenues, facilitating its application.
JEL Classification: G28, G38
Keywords: Basel IV, Capital Requirements, Standardised Approach, Internal Model Ap-
proach
Basilea IV Un futuro sombrío para los modelos de riesgo de
déficit esperado. Evidencia del mercado de valores mexicano
Resumen
A fin de determinar la suficiencia de los Capitales Mínimos Regulatorios (MCR) de Ba-
silea IV durante crisis financieras en el mercado mexicano, se propone una simulación
estructural que abarca los enfoques Estandarizado (SA) y de Modelos Internos (IMA) ba-
sada en diversas técnicas. La investigación encuentra un incremento excesivo en MCR aún
en situaciones de desplomes, enfatizando que SA establece mínimos elevados, mientras
que solamente los modelos ultra-leptokúrticos superan las exigentes pruebas de valida-
ción. Se recomienda adaptar los parámetros de SA a diversos escenarios, de este modo
evitando innecesaria sobreconstitución de capital y, posteriormente, revisar la evaluación
de IMA y su interacción con SA. Aunque los resultados detectan la necesidad de ajustes
en la normativa, pruebas adicionales en más mercados podrían reforzar las derivaciones,
aún considerando que el artículo se encuentra entre los pioneros al momento de analizar
el comportamiento y la relación SA-IMA en los mercados emergentes latinoamericanos.
Basilea IV entrega altos MCR, incluso en movimientos anormales, colocando a IMA en
desventaja y desalentando su desarrollo. La adopción de coeficientes de calibración flexi-
bles alinearía ambos enfoques, allanando su aplicación.
Clasificación JEL: G28, G38
Palabras clave: Basilea IV, Requerimentos de Capital, Enfoque estandarizado, Enfoque
de modelo interno
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1. Introduction
In a statement in 2012, Andrew Haldane, Chief Economist and Executive Director of
Monetary Analysis at the Bank of England, singled out the shortage of capital as one of
the main motives that prevented banks and financial institutions to weather the financial
crisis of 2007-2008 that led to the consequent controversial bailouts. Apparently, his view
is shared by supranational regulators like the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
(BCBS), given the scale of the changes of Basel III with respect to its predecessor Basel
II, particularly in key areas like market, credit and liquidity risks. However, even though
the main objectives residing in strengthening the capital base and increasing the liquidity
and credit risk provisions seem achieved, the Basel mandate is continually evolving.
Even though Basel III is still in implementation phase, in the meantime, the BCBS
is reviewing its structure with a view to carry out some modifications to improve so-
me departments, especially through a programme specifically directed to address market
risks. Acknowledging the academics’ opinion, the BCBS issued a document comprising
the guidelines of the future Capital Framework with such depth that many practitioners
ventured to call it Basel IV2 (Heltman (2014)). The Directive contains a radical overhaul
to the capital ratio, risk weights and the two appraisals designed to compute the Mini-
mum Capital Requirements (MCR): the SA and the IMA, which might be interpreted
as a move away from the latter towards the former. The appearances suggest that the
BCBS was suspicious of the banks’ reliance on internal models and therefore demanded
the implementation of different new standards imposing a much higher floor that may
eventually result appropriate for some institutions but inadequate for others. The whole
new regulatory body seems to be shifting away from a models-based structure towards
an arguably easier scheme characterised by simpler and tougher capital ratios, combined
with additional risk measures. Market-risk models, then, give the impression of being
thrown into oblivion, thus obscuring their outlook.
It is precisely there where the motivations of the current study lie. Due to the extent
of the new regulations, the opportunity to raise objections and to express the concerns is
proper. Furthermore, as for the first time in the history of the supranational regulations
the BCBS makes a distinction between developed and emerging markets, dealing with the
latter to the detriment of the former adds an extra layer of interest in the novelty of the
route taken here. Consequently, the article will be focused on and contribute to the finan-
cial literature carrying out a thorough quantitative evaluation of the prospective norms
in the context of the Mexican emerging economy, carefully ascertaining the characteris-
tics of the newly enacted SA and IMA (employing a considerable array of techniques);
assessing the appropriateness of the capital floors and gauging the balance between the
SA and the IMA. A perusal of the regulatory body suggests a crackdown on modelling,
characterised by the stressed calibration for ES-based models accompanied by the strin-
gent set of validation tests, which, coupled with the radical revamp of SA designed to
hike minimum capital levels, lends to hypothesise that the future for models under Basel
IV would look grim, possibly rendering them short of useless because of two potential
reasons: a) their capital levels could exceed those of the SA by huge margins, or b) they
may deliver capital levels smaller tan SA’s but, although still sufficient enough to provide
protection against huge market slumps, be ineligible on the grounds of situating below
the official floor. The main objective, then, is to evaluate the test the appropriateness of
the proposed regulations through the hypothesis of the disadvantageous position in which
the theoretical assessment of the norms locate the modelling avenue; (if) and once it is
determined, the paper will proceed to recommend straightforward alternatives to align
2The revolutionary scope of the alterations fosters the presumption that the financial industry might
be in the doorstep of a new Basel Capital Accord, namely Basel IV. Therefore, the study will refer to it
as Basel IV.
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SA and IMA and find a reasonable compromise that may allow banks to select between
them instead of adopting a mandatory alternative.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 synthetically outlines the basic notions un-
derpinning the Basel IV reform, spanning the characteristics of the SA and the IMA
and specifically emphasising the interaction between both approaches regarding the new
floor embodied in the SA; Section 3 sketches a review of the literature that permits the
location of the current study among the existing academic body and spot its distinctive
elements that may contribute to the field; Section 4 explains the methodology that guided
the study, from the construction of the portfolios to the calculation of the MCR and the
respective validation standards; Section 5 details the results of the experiment from the
regulatory stance and identifies the incentives (or, more precisely, the lack of) embedded
into one or the other alternative and, furthermore, into the several possibilities belonging
to the IMA and, finally, Section 6 provides the concluding remarks that reflect on the
whole process and highlights the policy implications that the Basel IV framework might
bring about stemming from its impact on the capital structure of the firms, simultaneo-
usly suggesting an alternative way –inside Basel platform- susceptible of remedying the
imbalances found.
2. The prospective Basel IV
In spite of the fact that Basel III remains to be fully applied, the BCBS embarked on a
thorough revision of the Basel III Capital Accord after realising that, in many respects,
the Basel 2.5/III package “. . . did not fully address the shortcomings of the framework”
(BCBS (2013)). In a series of Consultative Documents (BCBS (2012, 2013 and 2014)),
the BCBS specified that the main areas of focus lay in: a) the trading book/banking
book boundary, b) the treatment of credit, c) the approach to risk measurement, d) the
incorporation of market illiquidity, e) the treatment of hedging and diversification, f) the
relationship between the IMA and SA, and g) the comprehensive revision of the IMA
and SA. In view of the strong bearing on the Pillar 1, namely the capital adequacy rules,
the current article discourses on topics c), f) and g) where Basel IV brings, prior to any
consideration about its adequacy, several radical changes compared with Basel III.
2.1 A new approach to risk management
The Consultative Papers of 2012 and 2013 highlighted two essential reforms which, along-
side the rest of the proposals, would determine the shape of the new scheme:
a) Substitution of VaR (Value-at-Risk) for ES (Expected Shortfall): given the conceptual
problems presented by VaR as a risk metric (Artzner et. al. (1999) and McNeil, Frey
and Embrechts (2005), Danielsson and Zigrand (2006), among others), ES constitu-
tes the official market risk measure for the IMA, calculated at 97.50% confidence
level. Therefore, the replacement also signifies the demise of the 99% in favour of the
97.50%3;
b) Calibration to stressed conditions: The BCBS is postulating the adoption of an “indi-
rect” approach to compute the ES over the observational period. Hence, in order to
bridge the difficulties that the identification of a strained period could pose in terms
of data availability for the full set of risk factors, banks should specify a reduced set
of risk factors relevant for their portfolios for which a relatively long history of obser-
vations is available. Although banks are allowed to select the appropriate factors for
their respective portfolios, the BCBS requires them to explain a pre-specified percen-
tage of the full variation of the ES model4. Using that reduced set of factors, ES is
3More precisely, the VaR at 99% will not be employed for capital determination purposes; its usage
seems restricted to the validation stage of the IMA.
4That percentage remains to be defined (BCBS (2013)).
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calibrated to the most severe 12-month stressed term available over the observation
period and afterwards scaled up by the ratio of the current ES employing the full set
of risk factors to the current ES utilising the reduced set of risk factors. Consequently,
the risk capital calculation features the following expression:
ES = ESR,S x
ESF,C
ESR,C
(1)
where:
ES : Expected Shortfall for risk capital purposes
ESR,S : Expected Shortfall using the reduced set of risk factors calculated over the
stressed period
ESF,C : Expected Shortfall using the full set of risk factors based on the current (most
recent 12-month) observation period
ESR,C : Expected Shortfall using the reduced set of risk factors based on the current
(most recent 12-month) observation period
2.2 The relationship between the Standardised and Internal Mo-
dels Approaches
The BCBS proposes to reinforce the role of the SA as a feasible fallback to the IMA
whenever these schemes are not appropriate for establishing regulatory capital. In that
sense, banks must calculate the capital charge employing the SA in a bid to reduce the
huge dispersion delivered by the present IMA techniques. The application of the SA as
a capital floor could, in the eyes of the BCBS, ameliorate the pernicious influence of the
most aggressive IMA assumptions.
Furthermore, a more rigorous process to ascertain the allocation of trading activities
for the IMA, involves three steps:
1. Step 1 : Overall assessment of the bank’s firm-wide internal risk capital model using
both qualitative and quantitative proofs (including Backtesting). At this stage banks
should individualise the different trading units;
2. Step 2 : Determination and evaluation of the specific trading activities (or trading
desks) subject to the IMA. A three-pronged quantitative criteria involving Back-
testing, Profits and Losses Attribution Tests (P&LAT) and Model-independent risk
assessment tool is to be employed to gauge the models’s performance and behaviour;
3. Step 3 : Following Steps 1 and 2, banks must identify which risk factors for each
trading desk shall be included in the model.
Failure to comply with Step 1 indicates that the entire trading book does not qualify
for the IMA and the SA has to be adopted instead; out-of-scope trading desks in Step
2 decrees the adoption of the SA, whereas non-modellable risk factors in Step 3 triggers
the constitution of capital add-ons stemming from stress scenarios. Only after passing
the three steps are banks allowed to compute the ES for the trading desks and their
aggregation in a global ES with diversification constraints5.
2.3 The comprehensive review of the Standardised and Internal
Models Approaches
The BCBS has put forward a thorough overhaul of both avenues in the most radical
reform since the Market Risk Amendment of 1996 (BCBS (1996)).
5Desks falling or opting out of the IMA must use the SA for at least one year.
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2.3.1 The revamped Internal Models Approach
Once the bank has determined the eligible trading desks subject to the IMA, and provided
it abides by the qualitative standards set by the BCBS (BCBS (2013))6, the calculation
of any model must contemplate a series of quantitative requirements. In this vein, the
techniques must observe7:
a) 97.50% one-tailed ES computed on a daily basis for regulatory capital purposes, both
for the trading desks and firm-wide portfolios;
b) ES calibrated to a period of stress according to the “indirect” approach materialised
in (2.1), with a sufficiently long sample for the reduced set of risk factors8;
c) ESRS estimated over the 12-month strained period in which the relevant portfolio
experiences the greatest loss, with the observation horizon dating back to the year
2005 and its data sets, alongside those supporting ESFC and ESRC updated at least
once a month or whenever market prices exhibit substantial variations;
d) Consistent with the VaR-based predecessors, BCBS does not prescribe a specific ES
model for Basel IV, as long as the bank’s technique captures all the material risks and
passes the model validation standards (Section 2.3.1.1);
e) Analogous to Basel II and Basel III, banks must constitute a daily capital minimum
requirement (MCRt) expressed as9:
MCRt = max (IMCCt−1; mc IMCCavg) (2)
where
mc = 1,5 (1 + k) (3)
and
IMCCt−1: capital charge generated by the IMA for the previous day (t-1)
IMCCavg: average of the daily capital charges generated by the IMA for the preceding
60 days
mc: multiplication factor subject to an absolute minimum of 1.5
k: add-on factor related to the ex-post performance of the model
It is important to state that in order to determine the value of k, banks must perform
Backtesting following Basel II and Basel III for the full set of risk factors (using V aRFC)10.
2.3.1.1 Model validation standards
Assuming the institution achieves the regulator’s approval or passes Step 1 above, the
evaluation of the eligibility of the trading desks demands a tough process involving11:
6The qualitative demands refer, in broad terms, to the constitution of risk management calculation
and control units, audit procedures and assessment tests (BCBS (2013)).
7The BCBS states some additional provisions regarding liquidity shocks. However, they lie outside the
reach of the present paper.
8The length of the observation period is yet to be specified after subsequent Quantitative Impact
Study (QIS), though the BCBS appears to be suggesting at least ten (10) years of history.
9The formula also comprises other components like the capital charge for positions subject to default
risk and the capital charge for risk factors deemed unmodellable. However, they are purposefully skipped
as they lie beyond the scope of the article. The interest reader may recur to BCBS (2013).
10BCBS (2004, 2009).
11The BCBS also proposes fourth criteria to assess the IMA applied, called “model independent risk
assessment tool” involving the desk-level, ES-based MCR, the size of the exposure and a threshold, which
is yet to be specified.
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a) Backtesting : it demands the comparison of the desk’s daily static VaR at both 97.50%
and 99% percentile applying at least one-year of the most recent data against the
portfolio’s actual P&L. Models delivering more than 30 and 12 exceptions respectively
detach the corresponding trading unit from IMA, sending it to capitalise under SA;
b) P&LAT : they require the computation of two monthly tests:
i) P&LAT1 :
P&LAT1 =
1
n
∑n
t=1
(
P&LTt − P&LAt
)
σ
(
P&LAt
) (4)
where
P&LTt: theoretical (model forecast) P&L for day t; P&LAt: actual P&L for day
t
If the indicator situates outside the range [-10%; +10%], the trading desk expe-
riences a breach, and four or more breaches in the last year means the trading
desk has to employ the SA until it passes the P&LAT and the associated ones.
ii) P&LAT2 :
P&LAT2 =
σ2
(
P&LTt − P&LAt
)
σ2
(
P&LAt
) (5)
If the ratio delivers values in excess of 20%, the trading desk posts a breach, and
four or more breaches in the most recent twelve months mean the trading unit
falls under the SA until it passes the P&LAT and the associated ones.
c) Risk factor analysis: Considering that the BCBS identifies the risk factors as interest
rates, exchange rates, equity prices and commodity prices, banks must nominate a set
of market prices and rates that drive the value of the respective positions for each
risk factor, which should be sufficient to capture all the material risks12 affecting the
portfolios. In this sense, the BCBS states that, for equity positions, market indices
could constitute a reasonable method to encompass the fluctuations in stock prices13.
2.3.2 The revised Standardised Approach
The modification of the SA constitutes arguably one of the most radical innovations of
Basel IV. Riding on the known concepts that the SA should provide a method to compute
the capital base for those banks not in need of sophisticated risk models and, furthermore,
act as a fallback to inadequate internal models, the appraisal appears hugely revamped
following a “partial risk approach” resembling the classic portfolio theory (Markowitz
(1952)), although with pre-specified risk weights and correlation parameters. In effect,
instruments with similar risk patterns are grouped into risk buckets for which the BCBS
affixes predetermined risk weights and, moreover, the hedging and diversification effects
are seized by means of preset correlation factors.
Specifically, the capital charge for equity risk is obtained after the ensuing steps:
a) Step 1 : allocation of net notional positions14 in the respective risk bucket according to
a criterion that takes into account the size, region and sector of the company (Table
12The BCBS informs that the reduced set of risk factors must explain the movements in the portfolio.
13The Committee emphasises that, for instance, positions in individual stocks could be expressed in
terms of the “beta-equivalents” relative to the corresponding market index. (BCBS (2013: 92)). Additio-
nally, it stresses that banks are allowed to build more sophisticated approaches.
14The BCBS allows offsetting long and short positions on the same equity name, thus working with
the net exposure.
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1). The boundary between “large” and “small” companies is established in a market
capitalisation of USD 2 billion, and developed markets encompass the following ones:
United States, Canada, the Eurozone, United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Switzerland, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Additionally, each bucket bears its
own risk weight (Table 2). and the “Residual Bucket” gathers all companies that may
not be allocated to buckets 1 to 10 because of data unavailability.
b) Step 2 : application of the formula that acknowledges hedging and diversification within
each risk bucket. Hence, for notional positions 1 to n:
Kb =
√√√√ n∑
i=1
RW 2iMV
2
i +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j>i
ρijRW iMV iRW jMV j (6)
where RWi, MVi and ρij represent the risk weight assigned to position i, the value
of the notional position i and the correlation parameter between positions i and j
respectively. ρij is established differently in accordance with the equity exposures
bearing identical or opposite signs15 (Table 3)
c) Step 3 : explicit acknowledgment of the hedging and diversification across risk buckets.
This last stage of the process allows the obtention of the Equity Risk Capital (ERC)
by means of the aggregation of the risk positions for each individual risk bucket. Thus
(2.3.5),
Equity Risk Capital (ERC) =
√√√√ B∑
i=1
K2b +
B∑
b=1
∑
c>b
γbcSbSc + KResidual (7)
where:
Kb: capital requirement determined in (2.3.4)
KResidual: capital requirement due to the residual bucket
Sb:
∑
i∈bRW iMV i
γbc: correlation parameter between buckets b and c, derived from the correlation matrix
in Table 4.
3. Literature review
The issue of capital sufficiency has always been a contentious one and appears far from
being settled, either from the regulatory or academic points of view. Even though the
advent of the successive Basel Capital Accords allowed the amendment of the glitches
in the previous regulations, the literature remains at odds regarding the virtues of the
mandates. In this sense, while Caruana (2005) hails Basel II in view of its evolutionary
aspects referred to implementation, calibration, validation and cross-border supervision,
Repullo and Suarez (2013) question the procyclicality of Basel II. The authors go beyond,
venturing to assert that Basel II bears more procyclical elements than Basel I, but, on the
other hand, its capital levels turn banks into safer business units. The snags of Basel II
become more evident in Herring (2005), who emphasises that the alleged gains from the
adoption of Basel II are far outweighed by the costs of implementation and compliance.
The BCBS, performing its role as the supranational regulatory authority, typically
employs the financial crises as a real time test to assess the adequacy of the Capital
Accords, and, after proper consultation periods, and QIS, enacts partial or radical modi-
fications to the existing order. However, it seems that it usually overlooks many important
15Identical sign refers to coincident long or short positions, whereas opposite sign denotes long and
short exposures.
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implications; Demirguc-Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2013) study a multicountry
panel of banks before and after the subprime crisis of 2007-2008 and argue that different
forms of capital exert different effects on the performance of the banks. Furthermore,
they advocate the endorsement of higher forms of capital such as the Tier 1 and tangible
common equity as alternatives to the BCBS’s risk-adjusted capital ratio on the grounds
of their relevance on the constitution of a stronger capital position.
After the 2007-2008 crisis and the consequent Basel 2.5 Amendment and Basel III
Capital Accord, many authors commented on the patterns of the new regulations. Perhaps
not surprisingly, the most stinging criticisms are referred to VaR, which application as a
risk measure was bolstered in Basel III. From the seminal paper of Artzner et. al. (1999),
VaR has been branded an ‘incoherent’ risk metric given its failure to comply with the
subadditivity property that any risk measure must portray16. Furthermore, Artzner et.
al. (1999) emphasise that VaR, by construction, can only estimate a quantile which does
not enable it to inform about losses beyond that point. That alleged flaw prompted the
BCBS to suggest other alternatives which may bridge those deficiencies like ES as well
as other Spectral Risk Measures (SRM) (Acerbi (2004)), of which the former seems to be
the BCBS’s preferred choice.
ES has been extensively studied (Artzner et. al. (1999), Acerbi and Tasche (2002),
Föllmer and Schied (2002), Yamai and Yoshiba (2005)) and branded as an intuitive and
coherent risk measure. McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005) highlight that ES reverts the
most notorious VaR’s snags given that: i) ES always complies with the ‘coherence’ axioms
established by Artzner et. al. (1999); ii) ES ameliorates the risk of selecting a particular
confidence level as it represents the average of losses beyond that confidence level. This
last property reveals especially important for regulatory bodies, which are undoubtedly
concerned with shortfalls greater than VaR, i.e., losses posing risk to the financial health
of the entity (BCBS (2012)).
Up to the so-called Basel IV17 Consultative Document, the BCBS had intended to
remedy VaR’s glitches with the introduction of several refinements, shaped in the enact-
ment of the stressed VaR and the exogenously determined Capital Conservation and
Countercyclical Capital Buffers (BCBS (2009)). However, instead of celebrating those
amendments, the literature demanded the end of VaR-based models in the capital frame-
work: Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2009) and Adrian and Shin (2013) opine that VaR
accelerates the crises instead of halting their progress. Basel IV effectively replaces VaR
for ES (BCBS (2012, 2013)) in what constitutes a significant departure from the previous
regulatory approaches to determine bank capital -both conceptually and procedurally-,
a move partially suggested by Hellwig (2009) and Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2009).
However, in addition to the most renowned snags referred to the IMA that the BCBS
intends to tackle (BCBS (2013)), it remains to be evaluated whether the inception of
ES as the official market risk measure reduces the alleged VaR ‘manipulation’ that may
enable banks to erect lower capital requirements, as highlighted by Hellwig (1995, 1996)
and Danielsson and Zigrand (2006), though the latter make use of derivatives.
The BCBS took special care in strengthening the process of evaluating the capital
estimation; in addition to the qualitative considerations, Backtesting and Stress tests
contained on Basel III, a new battery of tests is proposed. Hence, admitting the difficulty
in backtesting ES in view of its inherent structure (Kerkhof and Melenberg (2004)),
the BCBS improves the current framework keeping an enhanced VaR-based Backtesting
(“Breach test”) and adding two P&LAT, which are designed to attest whether VaR models
16Danielsson et. al. (2005) and McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005) were able to find some instances
where VaR could achieve subadditivity. However, they stress that those examples constitute asymptotic
results for nonsensically high confidence levels, irrelevant in practice.
17For the sake of simplicity, the current article will denote as Basel IV the proposals contained in the
documents that review the market risk framework (BCBS (2012, 2013)).
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keep track of the variations in the dynamic properties of risk as demanded by Berkowitz
and O’Brien (2002)18.
The BCBS maintains its stance at the time of dealing with the schemes within the
IMA as there are no specific indications on that respect. Consequently, all the techniques
developed by the practitioners might in principle be applied to estimate ES, much in
the same fashion than in Basel II and Basel III; in this vein, alternatives like Historical
Simulation (Manganelli and Engle (2001), Dowd (2005)), Filtered Historical Simulation
(Barone-Adesi, Bourgoin and Giannakopoulos (1998), Boudoukh, Richardson and Whi-
telow (1998)), Conditional Volatility (McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005), Alexander
(2008), Engle (1982), Bollerslev (1986), Taylor (1986), Nelson (1991)) and Extreme Va-
lue Theory (Embrechts, Klüppelberg and Mikosch (1997), McNeil and Saladin (1997),
McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005), Coles (2001), Reiss and Thomas (2007)) are avai-
lable, among many others (Christoffersen (2003), Alexander (2008)). The fitting prowess
of the representations remain to be analysed, particularly in the event of major crises
(which constitute the BCBS’s major concern), although Rossignolo, Fethi and Shaban
(2012, 2013) show that highly leptokurtic models could –under certain circumstances-
have prevented banks from falling into bankruptcy to the point of avoiding the more
stringent Basel III regulations.
The SA has also been subject to a major revamp under Basel IV proposed reform
in order to achieve the major objectives outlined by the BCBS (2014) materialised in:
providing an alternative methodology for banks not qualifying for the IMA, finding a
credible fallback for models and, finally, facilitating the comparison of capital levels across
borders. In this sense, the BCBS put forward a sensitivity-based approach that resembles
the Markowitz framework (1952), although the market correlations are prescribed by the
BCBS. The BCBS (2014) nonetheless informs that market participants were demanding
the ditching of the flat rate characteristic of Basel II and Basel III in favour of a more
market oriented appraisal.
The issue of capital sufficiency, finally, has always been subject to heated controversy,
particularly because of its close connection with the regulatory requirements, given that
banks usually tend to adjust their capital buffers in such a manner that they only exceed
the minimum levels by a small margin (Berger et. al. (2008)). Consequently, the adequacy
of the capital framework acquires utmost relevance and, consequently, it is not surprising
to find opposing views: from Haldane (2011) who underlines the complexity and lack of
robustness of the regulatory structure which augments the model error in the IMA and
the ensuing inappropriateness of the capital ratios, to the staunch support of the coun-
tercyclical capital buffers in Shim (2013) and the criticism launched by Rossignolo, Fethi
and Shaban (2013) who question the application of Basel III and propose the utilisation
of Basel II with highly leptokurtic models, as well as a complete revision of the SA.
The current article contributes to the literature from different angles, with reference
to the new proposals susceptible of being labelled Basel IV: in the first place, it targets
the quantification of the introduction of ES in the respective settings for the estimation
of MCR using a variety of models (IMA) in comparison with the analogous requirements
in Basel II and Basel III; in the second place, it critically evaluates the numerical rela-
tionship between the ES-based IMA and the market sensitive SA assessing the incentives
to develop accurate internal models and, in the third place, it fosters the suitable and
(easily) applicable calibration remedies in order to align incentives, specifications and
capital buffers between IMA and SA.
18It is important to emphasise that stress tests are also part of the assessment structure of Basel IV
(BCBS (2013)).
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4. Methodology
To assess the impact of the new proposals on the banks’ capital base, the present paper
works on long stock portfolios comprising Mexican companies. For the sake of simplicity
and tractability, two classes of three asset portfolios are constructed: Portfolio 1 –equally
weighted- and Portfolio 2 –minimum risk-19, and firms are selected and allocated pur-
suing data reliability and consistency employing primary data extracted from Thomson
Reuters R© and finally applying Basel IV criteria referred to the allocation in terms of
‘large’ or ‘small’ firms20 (Table 5, Columns [8-9]).
IMA and SA allow the determination of capital levels. With regards to the former, the
article employs Historical Simulation (HS), Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) featuring
GARCH and EGARCH specifications appended by Normal and Student-t distributions
(FHS/GN, FHS/EN, FHS/Gt and FHS/Et), Conditional Volatility (CV) encompassing
GARCH and EGARCH techniques estimated with Normal and Student-t distributions
(CV/GN, CV/EN, CV/Gt and CV/Et), Extreme Value Theory (EVT) via Peaks Over
Threshold (POT) after GARCH-Normal pre-whitening (Embrechts et. al. (2005)) as well
as the so-called Linear schemes (enhanced by Normal and Student-t distributions) as
indicated by Penza and Bansal (2001). All IMA representations are afterwards tested
applying the preceding Steps 1 to 2 (Backtesting and P&LAT), whereas, Step 3 (Risk
Factor Analysis), Portfolios 1 and 2 from every country are mapped to the respective
market index and the resulting R2 calculated21.
The paper proceeds comparing the ERC arising from every (validated) IMA with
that surging from the SA for both portfolios in a bid to gauge the pertinence of the
corresponding levels. Furthermore, the contrast between the MCR belonging to Basel’s
IV most accurate IMA and SA with Basel’s III MCR using the same models, conveys an
idea about the profundity of the modifications contained in Basel IV.
Finally, the article proposes some straightforward routes to solve the likely problems
that may arise because of the disparity in the capital levels derived from IMA and SA,
furthermore contributing to deal with the incentives problem that –again- appears in Ba-
sel IV. The paper bolsters the use of a series of calibration parameters that contribute to
level the Loss Coverage Ratio (LCR) across the approaches.
5. Results
The outcome of Basel IV methodology displays several differences compared with its pre-
decessor Basel III, from the validation process that the IMA appraisal is subject to the
behaviour of the SA.
5.1. Basel IV validation process
Table 6 (Panels A and B) depicts the result of the Backtesting, carried out at 99%,
following Basel II and Basel III procedures and, while Panel A reports the quantity of
exceptions, Panel B indicates the penalties envisaged as a result of the test. In this sense,
it is not surprising the failure of HS and the Linear (Normal and Student-t) specifications
to pass Backtesting. Reliance on the Normal distribution appears to affect CV models
(GARCH and EGARCH) more than FHS ones (EGARCH), whilst the Student-t distri-
bution improves the performance only for CV models. Given that the rest of the schemes
pertain to the Yellow Zone (i.e., bear some sort of penalty), a closer examination of Ta-
19The minimum risk portfolio is calculated according to the Mean Variance Criterion (MVC), i.e,
following Markowitz’s (1952) guidelines. It is acknowledged that, among the many ways to construct
portfolios, those utilised belong to the most renowned ones.
20’Large’ firms report market capitalisation equal to or over USD 2 billion.
21Even though Basel IV does not specify which R2 value could qualify as significant, the current paper
will validate R2 figures about 0.50, tantamount to expressing that the index explains at least 50% of the
variations in the value of the respective portfolios.
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ble 6 Panel B suggests the notion that, in principle, the empirical distributions produce
smoother estimates than the theoretical Normal or Student-t, reflected in the surcharges
envisaged for CV models. Finally, EVT manages to deliver outstanding results with no
exceptions and, therefore, does not require additions to the capital base due to higher
VaRs22.
Tables 7 and 8 –Panels A and B- inform the outcome of the first part of the second
stage of the evaluation process contained in Basel IV. In that respect, Panels A and B
of Table 7 evince the exceptions recorded at 99% and 97.50% whereas Panels A and B
of Table 8 report whether the models are susceptible of being utilised23. The comparison
of Panels A and B of Table 8 shows that the BCBS achieves coherency at the time
of establishing the boundaries for each confidence level as the absence of discrepancies
reinforces the outcomes obtained (Table 9). The second step of the second stage involves
the newly enacted P&LATs, P&LAT1 and P&LAT2 (as expressed in formulas 2.3.3 and
2.3.4. above). Tables 10 and 11 –Panels A and B- exhibit the quantity of breaches recorded
in the Backtesting period and the specification that would be used to capitalise the trading
desk for each test respectively. Table 12 shows the result of the whole Step II (Stages 1
–Backtesting- and 2 –P&LAT1 and P&LAT2-), where it may be appreciated that all
FHS techniques for both portfolios are given the all clear. As aforementioned, EVT again
passes Step II with flying colours.
Table 13 exposes the outcome of Steps 2 and 3 of the validation process, which blends
Basel II and Basel III’s Backtesting with Basel IV’s Steps 1 and 2. The display conveys the
idea of a much more rigourous approach on the part of the proposed new Capital Accord,
arguably due to the establishment of the Step 2 (further Backtesting and P&LATs). In
that respect, only a handful of specifications would be allowed as IMA in selected coun-
tries: nearly all FHS models (except FHS/EGARCH-T in P2), CV/GARCH-t and EVT.
However, the associated analysis of Table 6 and Table 13 crowns EVT as the most relia-
ble model as it does not take any penalty under Stage I (former Basel Backtesting) and,
additionally, weathers Step 2 without any exclusion. This result should not be labelled as
surprising, although the novelty in this occasion resides in the fact that the methodology
circumvents the prospective Basel IV more stringent criteria. In view of the aforementio-
ned reasons, and considering its untainted performance, the rest of the article employs
the EVT-based model in the issues connected with capital levels and its interaction with
the SA and further relationships.
Step 3 deals with the identification of the risk factors to be included in the capital
calculation formula under ESRC and ESRS in formula (2.1). As expressed in 2.3.1.1. c)
above, the BCBS (2014) suggests that with regards to equity exposures, an equity index
would, in principle, suffice the construction of a reduced risk-factor model provided it
explains the movements of the portfolio with a degree of accuracy embodied in a (high)
value of the R2 24. In this vein, the blue-chip index (Table 14 Column [3]) may reaso-
nably approximate the movement of the portfolios as the R2s situate on or above the
50% threshold (Table 14 Column [4]), presumably granting approval for the usage of the
corresponding IMA.
5.2 Basel IV Capital Levels
Table 15 depicts the MCR arising from all the models, calculated for both portfolios. Un-
fortunately, the question of the adverse incentives to employ the most accurate techniques
underlined by Rossignolo, Fethi and Shaban (2013) in Basel III hovers around in Basel IV
22Quite surprisingly, the prospective Basel IV documents do not state clearly whether models failing
Basel III Backtesting are disqualified although it would appear sensible to act that way.
23“IMA” and “SA” mean that the scheme registers less and more than 12 and 30 exceptions at 99%
and 97.50% respectively.
24Although the exact value of that R2 is not defined yet, the document hints at ‘high enough’ figures.
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too, given the fact that models with unblemished reputation can still deliver MCR higher
than penalised ones. In this vein, a simple comparison of the MCR that the two of the
representations capable of overcoming the validation process (for instance, CV/GARCH-t
and EVT) shows that in some occasions the former suffers Backtesting penalties (Step 1)
and still manages to constitute lower MCR than the latter (Table 6 Panel B and Table
15): P1 (k=50%) and P2 (k=85%). However, the figures offer some consolation in terms
of the incentives because CV/GARCH-t appears capable of producing the smallest MCR
among all those techniques that pass Basel IV validation process (Table 6 Panel B and
Table 15), thus signalling the healthy intention to provide right accuracy incentives.
Much in the same fashion as in Basel III, Table 15 Column [11] beckons the somewhat
excessive amount of capital buffers that an institution resorting to EVT may be compe-
lled to constitute. Even though that situation is consistent with the main characteristics
of the theory, the values reported seem nevertheless relatively high for the purposes in-
tended, which might result dampened following the procedures suggested in the ensuing
paragraphs. On the other hand, the fact that Basel IV relies on ES for the estimation
of IMA-based EVT does not automatically induce the constitution of higher MCR, com-
pared with Basel III’s VaR-based MCR as Table 16 Panel A, Columns [2-4]. It may be
appreciated that the influence of the addition of the stressed VaR in Basel III as oppo-
sed to the ratio scheme courtesy of Basel IV plays a role not to be neglected and may
potentially help to explain the reasons behind a VaR-based formula exceeding an ES one
(Table 16 Columns [2-4]).
As aforementioned, the SA also suffers major restructuring, crystalised in the (more
than) duplication of the MCR (Table 16 Panel A, Columns [6-7]). The approach taken
by the BCBS in Basel IV should represent a huge step forward, both in the capital levels
and in the derivation of the ERC from expression (2.3.5). Notably, the establishment
of fixed risk weights and correlation parameters produces very stable and uniform ERC
(Table 16 Panel A, Column [6]) with a stunningly low standard deviation of 0.91% as
contrasted with the 1.91% delivered by the IMA-EVT25. In principle, the MCR obtained
through the SA would prove sufficient to withstand crisis of significant magnitudes and,
furthermore, raise the capital floor to considerable minimum levels, therefore achieving
one of the BCBS’s most pressing concerns.
5.3 Interaction between IMA and SA
The relationship between the revised IMA and SA undoubtedly comprises one of the
aspects of the utmost relevance to evaluate the extent of the revamp. Accordingly, Table
16 Panel A informs the comparison between the MCR calculated employing Basel III’s
and Basel IV’s SA and IMA via EVT.
Unsurprisingly, EVT delivers higher MCR than the SA across the board both under
Basel III and Basel IV configurations (Table 16 Panel A, Columns [2-7]); however, due to
the thorough review carried out on the SA, the gap between the most accurate IMA ver-
sion and SA shrinks ostensibly from +677% to +25% (average terms) respectively (Table
16 Panel A Columns [8] and [9]), thus fulfilling the BCBS’s declared aim of overhauling
the SA and hinting at the insufficiency of the equity base provided by the SA during
market turbulence. Furthermore, the 246% growth in the SA capital buffer, compared to
the decrease of 44% (average figures) of the IMA (Table 16 Panel A, Columns [4] and
[7]) gives credit to that notion despite the introduction of ES and the inclusion of the
stressed ES in (2.1).
The crusade of the BCBS to raise the MCR by setting substantially higher capi-
tal floors could be grasped glancing at Table 16 Panel B, which deploys the Basel IV
MCR computed with the SA and the model contributing with the lowest MCR, i.e.,
25Acknowledging the volatility in the estimation of the Generalised Pareto Distribution (GPD) charac-
teristic of the EVT (Reiss and Thomas (2007)).
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CV/GARCH-t. Overlooking the limitations of average values, the overall MCR provided
by the SA exceed those by the IMA by 4% approximately (Table 16 Panel B, Column
[4]). Moreover, the effect of the rise of the floor (“. . . credible fallback. . . ”, BCBS (2014))
embodied in the SA appears plainly reflected in Table 16 Panel B, Column [6]), given that
in 1 out of 2 cases (50%), the MCR correspond to the floor, i.e., SA, instead of the IMA,
which means that in half of the portfolios the amount delivered by the CV/GARCH-t
situates below the SA.
5.4 The gloomy future for market risk models
On the grounds of the examples, the interaction between the IMA and the SA in Basel IV
poses a gloomy future for the models in the sense that those prospective regulations do
not seem to provide enough incentives to make use of the IMA-ES avenue to calculate the
MCR. The extent of that plight is conveyed by Table 17, which portrays a comparison of
the LCR for both appraisals -formerly proposed by Rossignolo, Fethi and Shaban (2012,
2013)- for Basel III and now included in BCBS (2014). It clearly reflects the intentions of
the BCBS, i.e. the increase in the SA and a crackdown on the IMA in Columns [4] and [6].
Both approaches provide substantial coverage, notwithstanding which the IMA’s MCR
comfortably exceeds SA’s by a sizeable amount. Therefore, given the characterisation of
the SA as a fallback, those precise techniques overcoming the strict validation process
appear to have little chance of being applied.
However, the current paper puts forward a straightforward alternative to employ the
specifications under the IMA in order to align the incentives to utilise either avenue26
-within the boundaries enacted by the BCBS- based on the introduction of multiplicative
calibration parameters in (2.1), (2.3.1), (2.3.2) and (2.3.5). Hence, for the IMA, ms and
mc* take the following form:
ES = ms
(
ESR,S x
ESF,C
ESR,C
)
(8)
and
MCRt = max (IMCCt−1; mc IMCCavg) (9)
where
mc
∗ = 1,5 (1 + k) (10)
while the SA would feature the sa factor as follows (5.4.4):
Equity Risk Capital (ERC) = sa

√√√√ B∑
i=1
K2b +
B∑
b=1
∑
c>b
γbcSbSc + KResidual
 (11)
Given the pressing concern embodied in the ostensible differences in the level of the
MCR, finding a common threshold where the two approaches approximately coincide
could in principle dampen the abysmal motivations to apply one or the other. In this
vein, the article proposes the calibration of the three parameters across portfolios to
minimise the RMSE and MSE27 varying one factor at a time, thus trying to keep the
original BCBS structure as unchanged as feasible. Table 18 Panels A and B report the
outcome of the exercise, with broadly similar values: holding ms = 1 and sa=1, mc*
should situate in the region of 2.50; keeping mc = 1,5 and sa=1, ms might equal 0.84
and, finally, fixing mc = 1,5 and ms = 1, sa could belong to the interval (1.50; 1.54).
26Even though the example is worked out via IMA-EVT, it may be computed using any other scheme
passing the validation criteria.
27RMSE and MSE stand for Root Mean Squared Error and Mean Squared Error respectively.
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The experiment could well be complemented and enhanced with a simulation analy-
sis depicting the level of the MCR and the corresponding LCR varying the calibration
parameters mc∗, ms and sa simultaneously. This procedure may suggest an idea about
the adjustments required to align the incentives, diminish the moral hazard embedded in
the current BCBS’s proposal and, at the same time, provide enough coverage for market
crises of considerable magnitudes. The outcome displayed in Table 19 Panels A, B and
C hints at the fact that equilibrium could be attained by calibrating the aforementioned
factors, without compromising the overall coverage. Hence, only for the sake of simpli-
city and acknowledging the limitations of average values, Columns [18-21] in Panel A
indicate that, selecting mc∗ = 1,80, ms = 0,76 and sa = 1,011 could deliver approxima-
tely MCR=0.21, amounting to LCR=1.80 (i.e., the level of MCR would withstand more
than 1.80 times the worst loss of the 2008 turbulence28). Table 19, consequently, gives an
inkling of the several possibilities that the national supervisors might introduce making
use of the flexibility of the parameters guided by the particular considerations verified
in their respective countries. Furthermore, it highlights the problems that the proposals
could pose to the regulated institutions, both in terms of the excess of the capital buffers
and the moral hazard that surges as a consequence of the imbalances between the IMA
and SA configurations.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
As part of the extensive review of the failures of the regulatory framework in the context
of the major crisis of 2007-2008, the BCBS introduced a package of reforms collectively
named Basel 2.5 and Basel III to be fully implemented by 2019. However, despite contai-
ning stark differences with their predecessor Basel II, they came under scrutiny and are
currently subject to ongoing analysis.
One of the stated aims of the proposed reform is to design a new overall approach to
risk measurement for the determination of MCR, characterised by the complete overhaul
of the SA and the IMA. Under the scheme, the former appears more risk oriented, thus
resembling the Markowitz’s setting, whereas the latter derives from two major drivers:
replacement of VaR for ES and stressed adjustment of the ES-based MCR formula. The
BCBS’s overt main objective undoubtedly resides in strengthening and increasing the
capital base in order to avoid the costly anomalies of former directives. The analysis
presented confirms that declared aim, in the sense that Basel IV appears as a move in the
right direction: the ES for the IMA and the risk tilt for the SA bring about a substantial
overall increase in the MCR. However, as it seems customary for all regulations, it leaves
many points to improve, many of which appear underpinned by the results of the study.
In the SA department, the BCBS correctly detected and modified the setting to enact
a more risk sensitive appraisal capable of producing higher capital buffers than its pre-
decessor Basel III. Those equity cushions seem almost uniformed across countries and
portfolios, therefore facilitating the comparison across jurisdictions, namely another of
the BCBS’s aim in Basel IV. That homogeneity, arguably achieved through the fixation
of the risk weights and correlation parameters across the assets, nevertheless raises lack
of efficiency connotations as shown by the substantially high LCR, given the fact that it
gives the impression to snub the changing pattern of the correlations among securities.
Regarding the IMA, the article points out that the procedure for the validation of the
models is excessively restrictive, thus stifling the development of techniques and limiting
the scope for innovation. Only the EVT overcomes the subprime crisis unscathed and,
although some others like CV/GARCH-t still manage to put in a reasonable performance,
its results are tainted by the numerous Backtesting penalties. Furthermore, the study also
detects the presence of inconsistencies, as the most precise techniques may be obliged to
28It may be the case that using average values could mask individual glitches for any portfolio.
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constitute higher capital levels than less accurate ones.
The interaction between the SA and the IMA posits the most serious concerns. Un-
doubtedly the BCBS attained its goals of bolstering the capital base by radically revam-
ping both SA and IMA, notwithstanding which the study finds the methodology rather
debatable. Although the transformation of the SA into a more risk-sensitive appraisal
is healthy, its efficiency remains questionable given that the fixed correlation and risk
weights parameters may play to its detriment by neglecting the changing nature of the
correlations among assets and, consequently, raising the cost of capital. On the other
hand, the IMA is at a (significant) disadvantage as a result of the rise in the capital floor
embodied in the SA’s values, thus blurring the advantages of the approach and generating
a very gloomy perspective for the models as many institutions will undoubtedly carry out
the MCR calculations via the SA.
In order to bridge that arguably unintended consequence, the paper puts forward the
introduction of calibrating parameters operating as multiplicative factors in the SA and
IMA formulas within the structure of Basel IV. This modification would entail greater
powers and responsibility to national regulators, who must decide on the appropriate
values according to the respective environments. These parameters are developed to align
the incentives between the SA and the IMA and, consequently, to restore confidence in
market risk models. As was manifested in the study, by determining the right combination
of mc*, ms and sa, the supervisors could, in principle, find a common platform upon which
a sound and balanced MCR framework could ground providing the correct incentives to
apply SA and the accurate IMAs.
The major contributions of the paper root in the ensuing distinct points. Initially,
it contains a relatively thorough quantitative idea of the impact that the novel Basel’s
MCR framework could exert on the banks’ capital structure, particularly in the context
of emerging stock markets; secondly, it confirms the traces of moral hazard and lack of
accuracy incentives for the IMA avenue; thirdly, it highlights that Basel IV upholds the
intrinsic imbalances of the dual alternative (SA-IMA) present in Basel II and Basel III,
to the point of rendering the IMA somewhat useless and fourthly, it proposes a (simple)
sustainable solution likely to reduce the ostensible difference between SA and IMA ma-
terialised in the introduction of the calibration parameters mc*, ms and sa within the
established framework susceptible of providing adequate capital coverage in the event of
major abnormal market slumps.
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Table 1. Risk Buckets and Economic Sector
Bucket
Number
Company
Size Region Sector
1 Large Emerging markets Consumer, Utilities
2 Large Emerging markets Telecommunications, Industrials
3 Large Emerging markets Basic materials, Energy
4 Large Emerging markets Financial, Technology
5 Large Developed markets Consumer, Utilities
6 Large Developed markets Telecommunications, Industrials
7 Large Developed markets Basic materials, Energy
8 Large Developed markets Financials, Technology
9 Small Emerging markets All Sectors
10 Small Developed markets All Sectors
Table 2. Risk Buckets and Risk Weights
Bucket N Risk Weight
1 55%
2 60%
3 45%
4 55%
5 30%
6 35%
7 40%
8 50%
9 70%
10 50%
Residual 70%
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Table 3. Correlation parameters within Risk Buckets
Bucket N Identical Sign Opposite Sign
1 20% 10%
2 20% 15%
3 25% 15%
4 30% 20%
5 20% 10%
6 30% 15%
7 35% 20%
8 35% 20%
9 15% 5%
10 25% 10%
Residual 100% 0%
Table 4. Correlation parameters among Risk Buckets
Buckets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 100%
2 15% 100%
3 15% 15% 100%
4 15% 15% 15% 100%
5 10% 10% 10% 10% 100%
6 10% 10% 10% 10% 20% 100%
7 10% 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 100%
8 10% 10% 10% 10% 20% 20% 20% 100%
9 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 100%
10 10% 10% 10% 10% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 100%
Table 5. Panel A - Portfolios and risk buckets – Mexico
Equity Sector Market CapitalisationMXN
FX rate
MXN / USD
Market Capitalisation
USD Size Bucket Number
Portfolio 1
Weights
Portfolio 2
Weights
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
America Móvil Telecommunications.Industrials 1,027,640,270,000.00 14.76 69,610,590,881.07 Large 2 33.33% 26.17%
CEMEX Telecommunications.Industrials 181,434,500,000.00 14.76 12,290,062,116.01 Large 2 33.33% 57.51%
Grupo México Basic Materials.Energy 328,097,810,000.00 14.76 22,224,783,406.83 Large 3 33.33% 16.32%
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Table 6.
Panel A - Backtesting – Quantity of exceptions – Confidence level 99%
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 18 6 6 9 9 11 6 13 12 0 26 20
Mexico P2 20 8 8 11 9 12 9 15 9 0 25 20
Panel B - Backtesting – Penalties: increase in add-on k – Confidence level 99%
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 100.00% 50.00% 50.00% 85.00% 85.00% 100.00% 50.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Mexico P2 100.00% 75.00% 75.00% 100.00% 85.00% 100.00% 85.00% 100.00% 85.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 7.
Panel A - Backtesting – Quantity of exceptions – Confidence level 99%
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 18 6 6 9 9 11 6 13 12 0 26 20
Mexico P2 20 8 8 11 9 12 9 15 9 0 25 20
Panel B - Backtesting – Quantity of exceptions – Confidence level 97.50%
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 27 16 16 20 19 18 16 18 17 0 34 30
Mexico P2 32 16 15 20 18 23 20 22 21 0 32 32
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Table 8.
Panel A - Backtesting – Models to be utilised – Confidence level 99%
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA IMA SA SA
Mexico P2 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA IMA SA SA
Panel B - Backtesting – Models to be utilised – Confidence level 97.50%
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA IMA SA SA
Mexico P2 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA IMA SA SA
Table 9. Summary of Backtesting at 99% and 97.50%
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA IMA SA SA
Mexico P2 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA IMA SA SA
Table 10. Panel B - PLAT2 – Quantity of breaches
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 2 0 0 2 2 4 3 5 5 0 3 3
Mexico P2 2 0 0 2 2 4 3 5 5 0 3 3
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Table 11.
Panel A – P&LAT1 – Models to be utilised
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA IMA IMA
Mexico P2 IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA IMA IMA
Panel B – P&LAT2 – Models to be utilised
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA IMA IMA
Mexico P2 IMA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA IMA IMA
Table 12. Joint analysis P&LAT
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA SA SA
Mexico P2 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA SA SA
Table 13. Basel IV validation tests – Joint analysis of Steps 1 and 2 - Models to be utilised
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
Mexico P1 SA IMA IMA IMA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA SA SA
Mexico P2 SA IMA IMA SA IMA SA IMA SA SA IMA SA SA
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Table 14. Step 3 - Risk Factor Analysis
Portfolio Factor Denomination R2
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Mexico P1 IPC Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones 72.41%
Mexico P2 IPC Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones 74.68%
Table 15. Basel IV MCR – Internal Models Approach
Model HS FHS FHS FHS FHS CV CV CV CV EVT Linear Linear
Portfolio G-N G-t E-N E-t G-N G-t E-N E-t POT Normal t
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Mexico P1 30.84% 39.81% 38.64% 43.41% 44.94% 47.83% 31.51% 47.64% 44.24% 44.13% 25.64% 26.78%
Mexico P2 31.03% 50.17% 49.42% 48.99% 47.54% 50.75% 44.06% 49.17% 45.37% 46.83% 27.17% 28.80%
Note: Figures in bold indicate CV/G-t delivering lower MCR than its counterpart SA (Table 16 Column [6]
Table 16.
Panel A – Basel IV MCR – IMA-EVT vs SA – Basel IV vs Basel III
Portfolio IMA-EVTBasel III
IMA-EVT
Basel IV % Variation
SA
Basel III
SA
Basel IV % Variation
% Variation
Basel III
IMA-EVT
SA
% Variation
Basel IV
IMA-EVT
SA
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Mexico P1 80.96% 44.13% -45.49% 10.50% 36.95% 251.87% 671.02% 19.45%
Mexico P2 82.20% 46.83% -43.03% 10.50% 35.66% 239.62% 682.82% 31.31%
Average 81.58% 45.48% -44.26% 10.50% 36.31% 245.75% 676.92% 25.38%
Std. Dev. 0.88% 1.91% 0.00% 0.91%
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Panel B – Basel IV second best IMA CV/GARCH-t vs SA
Portfolio MCRCV-GARCH-t
MCR
SA % Variation
MCR
Basel IV
Official
Appraisal
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Mexico P1 31.51% 36.95% -14.71% 36.95% SA
Mexico P2 44.06% 35.66% 23.54% 44.06% IMA
Average 37.79% 36.31% 4.42% 40.51%
Table 17. MCR and LCR – IMA-EVT vs SA
Portfolio Maximum loss IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA
Year 2008 MCR LCR MCR LCR
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Mexico P1 -10.86% 44.13% 406.28% 36.95% 340.12%
Mexico P2 -12.18% 46.83% 384.41% 35.66% 292.75%
Table 18.
Panel A – The optimisation problem: RMSE
Factor mc* ms sa RMSE
mc* 2.51146 1.00000 1.00000 0.47519
ms 1.50000 0.83715 1.00000 0.47519
sa 1.50000 1.00000 1.54273 0.36276
Panel B – The optimisation problem: MSE
Factor mc* ms sa MAE
mc* 2.50345 1.00000 1.00000 0.59235
ms 1.50000 0.84015 1.00000 0.59235
sa 1.50000 1.00000 1.50316 0.51414
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Table 19.
Panel A – Sensitivity analysis – Selected examples
Portfolio IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA
Appraisal mc=1.40 ms=0.68 sa=0.89 sa=0.89 mc=1.50 ms=0.70 sa=0.92 sa=0.92 mc=1.60 ms=0.72 sa=0.95 sa=0.95
LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]
Mexico P1 1.3142 0.1457 2.6748 0.2906 1.4220 0.1545 2.8830 0.3132 1.5601 0.1695 3.1124 0.3381
Mexico P2 1.2199 0.1486 2.3023 0.2804 1.3454 0.1639 2.4814 0.3023 1.4761 0.1798 2.6789 0.3263
Average 1.2808 0.1472 2.4886 0.2885 1.3837 0.1592 2.6822 0.3078 1.5181 0.1747 2.8957 0.3322
Panel B – Sensitivity analysis – Selected examples (cont.)
Portfolio IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA
Appraisal mc=1.70 ms=0.74 sa=0.98 sa=0.98 mc=1.80 ms=0.76 sa=1.01 sa=1.01 mc=1.90 ms=0.78 sa=1.04 sa=1.04
LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR
[14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25]
Mexico P1 1.7037 0.1851 3.3501 0.3639 1.8526 0.2012 3.2656 0.3938 2.0070 0.2180 3.2978 0.4267
Mexico P2 1.6120 0.1964 2.8835 0.3512 1.7529 0.2135 3.1206 0.3801 1.8990 0.2313 3.3807 0.4118
Average 1.6579 0.1908 3.1168 0.3576 1.8028 0.2074 3.3731 0.3870 1.9530 0.2247 3.3654 0.4193
Panel C – Sensitivity analysis – Selected examples (cont.)
Portfolio IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA IMA-EVT IMA-EVT SA SA
Appraisal mc=2.00 ms=0.80 sa=1.07 sa=1.07 mc=2.10 ms=0.82 sa=1.10 sa=1.10
LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR LCR MCR
[26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33]
Mexico P1 2.1668 0.2354 4.2404 0.4606 2.3332 0.2533 4.5638 0.4957
Mexico P2 2.0502 0.2497 3.6498 0.4446 2.2065 0.2688 3.9282 0.4785
Average 2.1085 0.2426 3.9451 0.4526 2.2693 0.2611 4.6000 0.4871
